Daily Justice - Latest News Updates in Nigeria

10 May 2025
The insurgency in northeastern Nigeria, driven primarily by Boko Haram and its splinter group, the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), continues to devastate communities, displace millions, and claim countless lives. Despite military efforts and international support, the violence persists, raising troubling questions about why these groups remain resilient. Allegations have surfaced that some Nigerian politicians and high-profile figures may be benefiting from the conflict, either financially or ideologically, complicating efforts to end the crisis. The controversial decision to halt the operations of South African mercenaries, who had made significant progress against the insurgents, further fuels speculation about vested interests. This article explores the factors sustaining the insurgency, the sources of its financing, and the motivations behind its persistence.

The Boko Haram insurgency, which began in 2009, seeks to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim north. ISWAP, a faction that emerged in 2016, has since surpassed Boko Haram in influence, operating with greater sophistication and territorial ambitions. Together, these groups have killed over 30,000 people and displaced more than 2.5 million in the Lake Chad region. Despite military campaigns, including the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Order and regional cooperation with Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, the insurgents continue to mount attacks, particularly in rural areas, using tactics such as suicide bombings, kidnappings, and raids.
Several factors contribute to the persistence of this violence. Widespread poverty and unemployment in northern Nigeria create fertile ground for recruitment, as young men and boys are either coerced or enticed into joining insurgent groups. The region’s porous borders with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon facilitate the movement of arms, fighters, and illicit funds. Additionally, the Nigerian military has faced challenges, including inadequate resources, low morale, and allegations of corruption, which have hampered counterinsurgency efforts. However, a more insidious factor has emerged: the possibility that some politicians and elites are benefiting from the conflict, either through financial gain or ideological alignment.

Concerns have been raised that the insurgency serves as a source of earnings for some Nigerian politicians, creating a perverse incentive to prolong the conflict. Posts on X have alleged that certain northern governors and political figures are involved in funding Boko Haram and ISWAP, though these claims remain unverified and should be treated with caution. For instance, accusations have pointed to governors in states such as Zamfara, Kebbi, Sokoto, Katsina, and Kaduna, suggesting they support the insurgency to further political or ethnic agendas. While no conclusive evidence supports these specific claims, the broader issue of corruption within Nigeria’s political and military establishments lends credence to suspicions of profiteering.
The insurgency has created opportunities for illicit financial gain through various channels. Military budgets allocated to counterinsurgency efforts, such as the $1 billion approved by President Muhammadu Buhari in 2018 for security equipment, have been marred by allegations of mismanagement. Transparency International reported in 2017 that military graft undermines Nigeria’s fight against Boko Haram, with funds reportedly siphoned off by officials. Additionally, the insurgency sustains a shadow economy involving arms trafficking, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom, which may enrich corrupt officials or local powerbrokers who act as intermediaries.

A significant turning point in the fight against Boko Haram came in 2014 when former President Goodluck Jonathan hired South African mercenaries from Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP). Led by Eeben Barlow, STTEP provided training, new weapons, and tactical support to the Nigerian Army. Their efforts, known as “Operational Anvil,” led to the recapture of 36 towns and the destruction of Boko Haram’s headquarters in Gwoza by early 2015. Equipped with night-vision goggles and helicopters, the mercenaries were instrumental in degrading the insurgents’ capabilities, particularly in Borno State.
However, shortly after President Buhari assumed office in 2015, STTEP’s contract was terminated. Barlow later claimed that Buhari’s advisors rejected their three-phase campaign strategy and made it clear that the mercenaries’ presence would not be tolerated. The decision sparked controversy, with some arguing it reflected Buhari’s preference for a Nigerian-led approach, while others suggested political motivations. Critics, including Barlow, pointed out that Buhari’s claim that Boko Haram was “technically defeated” in 2015 was premature, as subsequent attacks demonstrated the group’s resilience. The abrupt dismissal of STTEP, which had achieved measurable success, raised questions about whether certain factions within the government or military benefited from a prolonged conflict, though no definitive evidence supports this theory.

Understanding the persistence of Boko Haram and ISWAP requires examining their sources of funding. According to a 2021 report by the London School of Economics, Boko Haram has secured significant funds through illicit activities, including an estimated $70 million between 2006 and 2011. These funds are derived from multiple sources:
Kidnapping for Ransom: Kidnapping has become a lucrative enterprise, with high-profile cases such as the 2013 abduction of a French family in Cameroon netting an estimated $3.15 million. The 2014 Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping, while ideologically motivated, also served as a bargaining chip for ransom and prisoner exchanges.
Extortion and Taxation: ISWAP, in particular, imposes taxes and “protection fees” on communities in the Lake Chad region, generating substantial revenue. A 2021 post on X claimed ISWAP moved approximately $36 million annually through Nigeria’s financial system, though this figure is unverified.
Illicit Trade: Both groups engage in smuggling, arms trafficking, and drug trading, leveraging Nigeria’s porous borders and weak regulatory frameworks.
External Funding: Reports suggest Boko Haram received initial funding from al-Qaeda, with Osama bin Laden allegedly sending $3 million to Nigerian groups in 2002. More recently, posts on X have speculated about funding from foreign entities such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, as well as groups like ISIS and the Taliban. However, these claims lack corroboration and should be approached sceptically.
Charitable Donations and Local Elites: A United Nations report highlighted that insurgents receive funds through charitable donations and contributions from wealthy extremists. Some analysts suggest that local elites, including religious leaders or politicians sympathetic to the insurgents’ ideology, may provide covert support, though evidence remains anecdotal.
The complexity of these funding networks makes it difficult for authorities to disrupt them. Elizabeth Donnelly of Chatham House noted that identifying and cutting off Boko Haram’s funding is a critical challenge, as the group operates within an informal criminal economy that is deeply entrenched in the region.

Another troubling dimension is the allegation that some high-profile politicians and elites sympathise with the insurgency on religious grounds. Boko Haram and ISWAP’s stated goal of establishing an Islamic state resonates with certain segments of Nigeria’s Muslim population, particularly in the north, where religious and ethnic identities are deeply intertwined. Posts on X have claimed that some northern elites support the insurgency to curb the spread of Christianity, though these assertions are speculative and lack substantiation.
Historically, politicians have manipulated religious and ethnic tensions to consolidate power. For example, in Plateau State, local politicians have exploited ethno-religious divisions between Muslim Fulani herders and Christian farmers to incite violence, exacerbating conflicts that intersect with the broader insurgency. During the 2015 election campaign, Buhari’s opponent, Goodluck Jonathan, was accused of playing the “Islam card” to portray the insurgency as a religious war, a tactic that deepened divisions. Buhari, a Muslim from the north, faced criticism for his perceived leniency toward Fulani herders, some of whom have been linked to banditry and violence, though these issues are distinct from Boko Haram’s jihadist agenda.
The designation of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), an Igbo separatist group in south-eastern Nigeria, as a terrorist organisation by Buhari’s government has also drawn parallels with Boko Haram. IPOB’s grievances stem from historical marginalisation and the 1967–1970 Biafran War, but its designation as a terrorist group, despite limited evidence of widespread violence, has fuelled accusations of selective enforcement. Some argue that the government’s hardline stance against IPOB, contrasted with its perceived ambivalence toward northern insurgents, reflects religious or ethnic biases among the ruling elite.

The persistence of Boko Haram and ISWAP is a multifaceted problem that cannot be addressed through military means alone. While Buhari’s administration made gains, such as retaking territories and killing key commanders like Abubakar Shekau in 2021, the insurgents have adapted, shifting to guerrilla tactics and exploiting governance gaps. The incoming administration of President Bola Tinubu, who assumed office in 2023, faces immense pressure to address these challenges.
Tinubu’s manifesto emphasises socioeconomic interventions, such as job creation and security sector reform, to address the root causes of insurgency. His support for amnesty programmes, like Operation Safe Corridor, which reintegrates former Boko Haram fighters, has shown promise but remains controversial. Expanding soft approaches, such as restorative justice and community dialogue, could complement military efforts, as hardline tactics have often led to collateral damage and alienated communities. Improving governance, tackling corruption, and strengthening border security are also critical to disrupting the insurgents’ financial networks.
International partners, including the UK, US, and UN, have pledged support, with initiatives like the 2019 Nigeria Regional Refugee Response Plan raising $135 million for displaced civilians. However, Nigeria must take ownership of its counterinsurgency strategy, ensuring that funds are used transparently and that political will is not undermined by vested interests.

The Boko Haram and ISWAP insurgency in northern Nigeria persists due to a toxic combination of poverty, weak governance, and complex financing networks. Allegations that politicians benefit from the conflict, whether through corruption or ideological sympathy, highlight the need for greater accountability. The decision to halt South African mercenaries’ operations remains a point of contention, underscoring the political complexities surrounding the insurgency. As Nigeria grapples with this crisis, a holistic approach—combining military action, socioeconomic development, and anti-corruption measures—offers the best hope for lasting peace. Until the incentives for perpetuating violence are dismantled, the people of northeastern Nigeria will continue to bear the brunt of a conflict that has gone on for far too long.